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Abstract
In this paper, I analyze consumption, aggregate savings,output and welfare implications of
ve di¤erent social security arragements whenever there is demographic uncertanity. Following
Bohn(2002), I analyze the e¤ect of an uncetain population growth in an extended version of
a modied Life-cycle model developed by Gertler(1999). Population growth dampens savings
and output under all arrangements. Pay-as-you-go-Dened Benet system appears to fare
better than all other alternatives, falling short of the private annuity market with no pension
system. But social security in general increases social welfare, with Fully Funded systems
faring the best. Thus there appears to be a clear tradeo¤ bewteen growth and social welfare.
The social security system also reduces the volatility of the economy.
JEL Classication: E21, E62, E64, H23, H24, H41, H55, J18, J26
Keywords: Demographic uncertainty, Social welfare, Life-cycle model, Annuity market,
Pay-as-you-go, Fully funded, Dened benet, Dened contribution.
1 Introduction
In this paper,I analyzed consumption, aggregate savings, output behavior and also welfare under
two popular social security arrangements when ever there is demographic uncertainty. The two
popular social security arrangements are Pay as You Go(PAYGO) and Fully Funded(FF) social
security. I analyze two variants of each of these social security systems, the Dened Benet(DB)
and the Dened Contribution(DC) arrangements. Under the assumtption of a xed benet rate
for the DB system and a xed tax rate for the DC system, I analyze both short run and long run
e¤ect of demographic uncertainty. I use a life-cycle model to carry out my analysis. In this setup,
the population is divided into two groups, workers and retirees. These two groups are heteroge-
nous in terms of their consumption and savings behavior. All the workers and all the retirees
would be ex-ante identical. In the model there is uncertainty about retirement and death. I
assume the transitional probability to retirement and death to be constant. In order to introduce
short run variation, I introduce a stochastic population growth process for the workers. I con-
sider a permanent increase in the growth rate of the worker population. Longrun analysis reveals
contrasting e¤ect of alternative social security system on the consumption, capital accumulation
Contact address:Department of Economics,Indiana University at Bloomington,Phone:812-855-
0179,email:murahman@indiana.edu. I would like to thank my Third year paper committee members, Eric
Leeper, Michael Kaganovich, and Brian Peterson for their valuable suggesstions during my research. I would like
to specially thank Hess Chung for his critical suggestions, thorough guidence and helpful scrutini of my work. I
would also like to acknowledge helpful comments from James Murray and Michael Plante. Finally, I thank all the
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and output. Social security arrangement appears to be in general benecial for the retiree, but
harmful to the workers consumption. Pension system also dampens output growth and discour-
ages savings. PAYGO-DB appears to fare better than rest of the arrangements, although far
worse than the private annuity market without social security or government intervention. This
contrasts with the existing literature. In case of the population shock, it appears that Inter-
generational risk sharing mechanism like the PAYGO systems provide better risk sharing. But
when social welfare is considered, there appears to be clear trade-o¤ between growth and welfare.
FF system appears to be welfare maximizing, even when compared with the non distortionary
private annuity market. In fact the latter performs the worst in terms of welfare. I also look at
speed of convergence of the economy and relate that to the volatility of the system. It appears
that social security arrangements in general reduces the volatility of the economy.
2 Motivation and Literature Review
In this paper, my plan is to look at the e¤ect of a permanent shock in the growth rate of the
work force on the economy under alternative social security systems using a new kind of lifecycle
model. Figure 1-5 highlights some of the demographic features and trends in employment in
USA. There are several interesting things in the that. First, although population growth has
slowed down after the 70s, with unemployment rate at its lowest and with a rapid increasing
rate of immigration fueled by positive signal from the policy makers, USA has been experiencing
a large inux of fresh and returning entrant into the labor force. An increased immigration to the
USA and similar increase in the number of naturalization of aliens denitely have contributed to
the improved performance of employment scenario over the changes in the labor force. This is
projected to remain at a higher level. Hence analyzing the e¤ect of an increases in the growth rate
of workforce force may be a useful exercise. The second motivation comes from the changes in the
nature of retirement in USA. Using HRS data, Quinn(1999) estimates that between one-third
and one -half of older Americans take on Bridge Jobs(temporary, sometimes lower paid jobs)
before exiting labor force completely. He concludes that retirement pattern in America are much
richer and more varied than the stereotypical one-step view of retirement suggests. Maestas(2004)
nds that more than one-third of retirees in their 50s go back to work after retirement. Using a
larger panel data set from the HRS survey, Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn(2005) nds that (Table
1 in appendix) in 1992, 15% of all the employed worker since age 49 had part time employment.
In 2002, in the same population(now ten years older), 25% of all employed men had part time
jobs. In 2000, this fraction was even larger, 33%. We also see similar picture for female. Table-2
reveals some more dramatic results. Out of the men who had full time job in 1992, 40% of
them in 2002 who then over 60 years of age had part time job. Out of the people who were
65 years and older(full retirement age in traditional sense) 37.5 % had part time job. Two
important conclusions arise from their ndings. First, retirees should no longer be modeled as
withdrawing completely from the labor force. Second, it is safe to assume that the part time jobs
that traditional retirees get after their retirement pays them a lower e¤ective wage.
In the literature, life-cycle models are popular for analyzing demographic transition. Ever
since the development of the life-cycle models by Brumberg, Ando, Modigliani(1956), these mod-
els have been extensively used by both policy makers and researchers. With the popularization
of Discrete Stochastic General Equilibrium(DSGE) models, there has been attempts to develop
a DSGE version of life-cycle model. To my knowledge, the rst of such model was developed
by Gali(1990) which tried to nd evidence of life cycle behavior in a DSGE model by adopting
the Blanchard-Yarri model. But in order to avoid problems with aggregation, he assumed an
identical(and constant) MPC for the workers and the retirees. Clarida(1991) was able to develop
a DSGE life cycle model where he was able to achieve aggregation without assuming constant or
identical MPC for all cohorts. My model is very close to Gertler(1999). He developed a DSGE
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life-cycle model which was a modied version of Blachard-Yarri(1965) model where he added a
transitional probability to retirement in addition to the original generational index parameter, the
transitional probability to death. Gertlers model has di¤erent MPCs for di¤erent groups. Based
on his assumption on the preference structure, Gertler argued that all the works have identical
MPC and all the retirees have same MPC. He was then able to aggregate all the consumption
functions of workers of di¤erent age and did the same thing for all the retirees. This allowed
him to derive an aggregate consumption function for the workers and also for the retirees. He
also developed aggregate human and non-human wealth functions for the economy and carried
out various scal experiments. Recently Ferrero(2005), Kilponen, Kinnunen and Ripatti(2006),
Keuschigg and Keuschigg(2004), Roeger(2005), Kara and Thadden(2006), Fujivara and Teran-
ish(2006), Grafenhofer, Jaag and Keuschigg(2006) have extended the Gertler(1999) model further
and studied di¤erent aspects of population ageing in their models. The main advantages of using
Gertlers framework is that one can apply various tools used in the Real Business Cycle literature
and analyze not only the stationary equilibrium, but also the transition path. But perhaps the
most popular Life cycle simulated models were developed by Auerbach and Kotilioko¤(1987) .
While analysis of debt in a representative agent might be misleading1, the analysis based on the
simulated life cycle models does not o¤er any analytical tractability. Second, other than few
authors such as Kotiliko¤, most of the researchers focus on various ways to make the existing
PAYGO system more e¢ cient. A comparative analysis of major alternative social security system
is nearly absent. Kotliko¤, Smetters and Walliser(1999) analyzes the e¢ cacy of alternative pri-
vatized social security systems using their famous simulated A-K model. De Nardi,·Imrohoro¼glu
and Sargent(1999) on the other hand analyzes the impact of various scal policy measures to
the retirement of the baby boomers under the present social security system. Finally, the work
closest to my paper are Bohn(2002, 1999, 1998) which carry out a comparative analysis of various
alternative social security and debt management schemes using an OLG framework. Although
his analysis provides signicant insight into the e¢ cacy of alternative policy regime, the OLG
framework limits its applicability for policy analysis. In a two period stochastic OLG framework,
although Bohn uses several RBC tools that I will also employ, I will be able to analyze the entire
transition path of the economy before and after a demographic shock which the former was not
able to do. The short run e¢ cacy of alternative policy regime is equally important for policy
makers. This paper will therefore be a value addition to that literature. My model is also dif-
ferent from the original work by Gertler(1999). His model has social security in the form of a
lump-sump tax-transfer scheme. This is clearly unrealistic, as Gertler himself acknowledges. My
model will have full specication of various social security regimes. My paper also di¤ers from
Gertler(1999) in terms of policy analysis. Gertler focuses mainly on various scal experiments like
changing the government debt. He also conducts some demographic experiments like changing
the dependency ratio by experimenting on transitional probability of death and experimenting
on the transition to retirement. My experiments will be di¤erent because I will focus only on
introducing demographic shock to the growth rate of the workforce. Although my experiments
will have similar e¤ect on the dependency ratio as Gertler, the source of that is di¤erent. Finally,
I will completely obstruct away from introducing any government debt in my model, which is the
driving force in Gertlers experiments.
Keeping in mind the above mentioned issues, I plan to develop a DSGE Life cycle model
with a fully developed social security system. I would like to incorporate some fundamental
uncertainties that were outlined in Bohn(2002) and Gertler(1999). In my model, I would like
to analyze how basic uncertainties are shared by the workers and the retirees under alternative
social security arrangement. My basic model would be an extended version of Gertler(1999). To
introduce life-cycle factors but maintain tractability, Gertler made two kinds of modications of
1Romer(1989) suggested that government debt might have very little e¤ect on the real activity in the Blan-
chard/Weil framework. Gertler(1999) argues that adding life cycle features would enhance the impact
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the Blanchard/Weil framework. First, Gertler introduced two stages of life: work and retirement.
Gertler then imposed a constant transition probability per period for a worker into retirement, as
well as a constant probability per period of death for a retiree. In my model, both the transition
probability per period of death and retirement would be stochastic with both following an iid
process . Second, Gertler employed a class of non-expected utility preferences proposed by Kreps
and Porteus(1978) and later popularized by Farmer (1990), Weil(1990) and Epstein and Zin(1990)
that generate certainty-equivalent decision rules in the presence of income risk. Gertler showed
that with these two modications it is possible to derive aggregate consumption/savings relations
for workers and for retirees. It is also possible to express the current equilibrium values of all
the endogenous variables as functions of just two predetermined variables: the capital stock and
the distribution of nonhuman wealth between retirees and workers. In my model, I will focus
on the aggregate behavior of the Workers and the Retirees separately and keep track of the
evolution of their human(wage income) and non-human(income from savings on capital asset)
wealth. Because the model permits realistic average periods of work and retirement, the model
is useful for quantitative policy analysis in a way that complements the use of large-scale models.
The advantage of this framework is its parsimonious representation, which helps make clear the
factors that underlie the results. In particular, it is possible to obtain an analytical solution for
aggregate consumption behavior, conditional on the paths of wages and interest rates. In this
case with variable work e¤ort, it is also possible to nd an analytical solution for aggregate labor
supply. Since the e¤ects of government and social security on the economy in this framework
work their way through consumption and labor supply, these (partial) analytical solutions will
help clarify the nature and strength of the policy transmission mechanisms. Further, because
of its parsimony, it is straightforward to integrate this life-cycle setup into existing growth and
business-cycle models in order to study a much broader set of issues which have already been
starting to be analyzed by many researchers.
3 Basic feature of the Life-cycle model
In this model, individuals have nite lives and they evolve through two distinct stages of life:
work and retirement. To derive a tractable aggregate consumption function and at the same
time permit realistic (average) lengths of work and retirement, I make three kinds of assump-
tions. These assumptions involve: (1) population dynamics; (2) insurance arrangements; and (3)
preferences.
3.1 Demographic feature
The population dynamics will follow a natural ordering to allow for tractability of our model.
Consumers are assumed to be born as workers. Workers face a constant retirement probability
!:Conditional on being a worker in the current period, the probability of remaining one in the
next period is !; while the probability of retiring is 1   !. These transition probabilities are
independent on individuals employment tenure. Once an individual has retired he is facing a
periodic probability of death 1   . The survival probability is assumed to be independent of
retirement tenure. Let us denote Nwt and N
r
t to be the total number of workers and retirees. In
period t+ 1;I assume that there would be (1 + nt+1   !)new workers born, where nt is another
white noise process with mean n and a variance 2. Hence the workerspopulation follows the
following law of motion:
Nwt+1 = (1 + nt+1   !)Nwt + !Nwt = (1 + nt+1)Nwt (1)
The retiree population follows law of motion:
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N rt+1 = (1  )N rt + (1  !)Nwt (2)
Dene  t =
Nrt
Nwt
to be the ratio of retiree to the worker, the dependency ratio. Using equa-
tion(1) and (2), we can show that the dependency ratio follows law of motion:
 t+1(1 + nt+1) =  t + (1  !) (3)
By using equation(3) we can drive the following:
Nwt+1
Nwt
= (1 + nt+1) (4)
N rt+1
N rt
= (1 + nt+1)
 t+1
 t
(5)
Nt+1
Nt
= (1 + nt+1)
1 +  t+1
1 +  t
(6)
lnnt+1 = n lnnt + e1t+1, 0 < n < 1 (6.a)
Where Nt is the total population at time t which is simply dened as follows
Nt = N
r
t +N
w
t (6.b)
Furthermore, in the stationary equilibrium,  t+1 =  t =  , nt+1 = n. Then N
w
t+1,N
r
t+1 and
Nt+1 all grow at the same rate n and the population dynamics in this model is stationary.
3.2 Insurance Market
To eliminate the impact of uncertainty about time of death, I introduce a perfect annuities
market, following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). The annuities market provides perfect
insurance against this kind of uncertainty. Under the arrangement, each retiree e¤ectively turns
over his wealth to a mutual fund that invests the proceeds. The fraction  of those that survive
to the next period receive all the returns, while the (estates of) the fraction 1  who die receive
nothing. Each surviving retiree receives a return that is proportionate to his initial contribution
of wealth to the mutual fund. Thus, for example, if Rt+1 is the gross return per dollar invested
by the mutual fund, the gross return on wealth for a surviving retiree is Rt+1 :
3.3 Preference
Now the timing of economic decisions are very important. Each persons make all his decisions
at the beginning of time, all his decisions are ex-ante.Now we will dene the utility function of
an individual who derives utility from consumption, c and leisure (1   l). Following Kreps and
Porteus(1978), and Farmer(1990), we will use a special class CES non-expected utility function.
The parametric form of the utility function will be following Weil(1990)
V zt (at 1) =

U(czt ; l
z
t )
 + zt+1Et
h
Vt+1(at) j z
i 

 1

(7)
This preference structure has the convenient property of separating between the elasticity of
inter temporal substitution given by  = 1(1 ) and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, given
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by : Following Gertler(1999) and Ferrero(2005), we assume  = 1:Then equation (8) can be
written as:
V zt (at 1) =
n
U(czt ; l
z
t )
 + zt+1Et
h
Vt+1(at) j z
io 1
(8)
According to Farmer(1990), These preferences generate certainty-equivalent decisions rules in the
face of idiosyncratic income risk, in contrast to standard Von-Neumann/Morgenstern utility func-
tions. Roughly speaking, because preferences are over the mean of next periods value function,
individuals only care about the rst moment of expected income in deriving their decision rules)2.
On the other hand, they do care about smoothing consumption over time. The curvature para-
meter  introduces a smooth trade-o¤ for individuals between consuming today versus consuming
tomorrow. In analogy to the standard case, the desire to smooth consumption implies a nite
inter temporal elasticity of substitution , given by  = 1(1 ) . Thus a virtue of the preference
structure is that it permits exibility over the choice of , which is a key parameter in deter-
mining the quantitative e¤ects of debt and social security. Furthermore, Weil(1990) argues that
the value of  determines peoples attitude towards intertemporal substitution, or inter temporal
consumption smoothing.  < 1 means Income e¤ects are smaller than Substitution e¤ect and
vice versa for  > 1:This certainty-equivalent analysis claries the respective role of risk aversion
and inter temporal substitution. The substitution e¤ect depresses the marginal propensity to
save as soon as agents are risk averse, as the optimum way to maintain the original utility level
when wage income risk increases is to consume more today (and thus avoid facing the increased
risk). The income e¤ect is simply a precautionary savings e¤ect, whose magnitude depends on
the inter temporal elasticity of substitution: increased wage risk implies a higher probability of
low consumption tomorrow, against which consumers will protect themselves the more, by con-
suming less, the more averse they are to inter temporal uctuations of consumption. Which of
these two conicting e¤ects dominates depends on the strength of the precautionary motive, i.e.,
on the magnitude of the inter temporal elasticity of substitution.
Finally, we assume the period utility function is Cobb-Douglas. With that the recursive utility
function of the agents in the model:
V zt (at 1) =
n
(Czt )
v (1  lzt )1 v

+ zt+1Et
h
Vt+1(at) j z = w; r
io 1
(9)
Where:
Et
h
Vt+1(at j w)
i
= !V wt+1 + (1  !)V rt+1 , wt+1 =  (10)
Et
h
Vt+1(at j r)
i
= V rt+1, 
r
t+1 =  (11)
Therefore, this preference representation now has conveniently separated period elasticity of
substitution v and inter temporal elasticity of substitution  for consumption.
Now I will proceed to solve the optimization problem by both the worker and the retiree.
Both worker and retiree have 1 unit of time which they allocate between work(l) and leisure.
Both receive the same wage Wt:But the retirees are less productive than the worker, which will
be reected by a productivity parameter :
2Since retirees do not face any income risk, they behave as if they had standard Von- Neumann/Morgenstern
preferences. In other words, the solution to their decision problem is the same as if they had standard preferences.
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4 Model with Private Annuity Market
In the baseline mode, we will consider optimization by the agents without any government inter-
vention. There will only be an annuity market .
4.1 Optimization by the Retiree
Retirees consume out of asset income and labour income. In general, one can index each retiree
by the time he was born j and the time he left the labor force k. Ultimately, it will not be
necessary to keep track of how assets and consumption are distributed among retirees over j and
k. Under my assumptions one can simply aggregate across di¤erent cohorts. Let Arjkt and C
rjk
t
be the assets at the beginning of time t and consumption at t, respectively, of a retired person
who was born at time jand left the labor force at time k; and let Rtbe the gross return on assets
from period t   1 to t. For a retiree at t who participates in a perfect annuities market, his
optimization problem looks like:
V rjkt (A
r
t 1)
fCrjk;lrjkg
=
nh
Crjkt
v
(1  lrjkt )1 v
i
+ 

V rt+1 (A
r
t )
o 1 (12)
Subject to:
Arjkt =
RtA
rjk
t 1

+Wtl
rjk
t   Crjkt (13)
With 0    1:
Following Gertler(2000),the consumers optimization has to satisfy additional conditions. The
rst one is as follows:
lim
i!1
Et
iRt+iA
rjk
t+i 1
iQ
j=1
Rt+j
= 0 (14)
The above equation is meant to rule out Ponzi schemes. The individual has to satisfy an
intertemporal budget constraint. He eventually has to pay o¤ any debt, he cannot continuously
play with Ponzi schemes. As it turns out, the above condition is not su¢ cient. We need a stronger
condition for optimization under uncertainty. The innite horizon budget constraint now has to
hold in expectations. It has to hold both in ex-ante and ex-post sense since the individual is
allowed to borrow only at riskless rate. It has to hold for every possible realization of Wt and
Rt which are essentially random variables. Thus the individual can borrow risklessly but has to
be able to pay back the debt. Therefore, the optimization problem of retiree has to satisfy the
following intertemporal budget constraint:
Et
26664
1X
i=0
iCrjkt+i
iQ
j=1
Rt+j
37775 = RtA
rjk
t 1

+Hrjkt (15)
Where Hrjkt is the expected lifetime labor income of the retiree dened later.
We also need the following requirement:
lim Et
i!1
fRt+ig =
 
R, lim Et
i!1
fWt+ig =
 
W (16)
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Where the last condition is a stationary condition on the fWtg1t=0process.
The rst order condition with respect Crt along with respective envelope conditions
3 yields
the following euler equation for the retiree:
Crjkt+1 =
"
Wt+1
Wt
(1 v)
(Rt+1)
#
Crjkt (17)
The rst order condition with respect to lrjkt along with respective envelope conditions yields
the following conditions:
lrjkt = 1 

Wt
Crjkt (18)
where
 =
1  v
v
(19)
In order to derive a decision rule for the retiree we employ Modigliani(1963) idea that a person
consumes a fraction of this life time income. Therefore, I guess that the consumption function
looks like:
Crjkt = t(
RtA
rjk
t 1

+Hrjkt ) (20)
Where t is the marginal propensity to consume(MPC) out of life income for the retiree. A
r
t 1
is the total non-human asset accumulated up to time t and Hrt is the expected lifetime labour
income for the retiree, which is given by:
Hrjkt =
1X
n=0
nWt+nl
rjk
t+n
nQ
z=0
Rt+z+1
= Wtl
r
t +
Hrjkt+1
Rt+1
(21)
We will also guess the following form for the vrt ,
V rjkt = 
r
tC
rjk
t


Wt
1 v
(22)
After some math, we can prove the following:
rt = (t)
 1
 (23)
Also, the MPC follows the following law of motion:
t = 1 

Wt
Wt+1
(1 v)
R 1t+1 
t
t+1
(24)
4.2 Optimization by the Worker
The workers maximization problem looks like:
V wjkt (A
w
t 1)
fCwjk;lwjkg
=
nh
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i
+ 
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rt+1

Aw
rjk
t
io 1
(25)
3For a detailed derivation, please see the appendix 1
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Subject to:
Awjkt = RtA
wjk
t 1 +Wtl
wjk
t   Cwjkt (26)
Aw
rjk
t = RtA
wjk
t 1   Cwjkt (27)
where the second budget constraint is for the worker who was worker today(t) but will become
retiree tomorrow(t + 1). As a result, this new retiree was not able to put his wealth into the
annuity market. Also, when the workers of period t retires at period t+1, he will no longer have
his labour income as a worker.
Similar to the retiree, we need Ponzi constraint for the worker which looks like:
lim
i!1
Et
Rt+iA
wjk
t+i 1
iQ
j=1

t+iRt+j
= 0 (27.a)
Where 
t+i is an additional factor that is used to weight the gross interest rate, to be dened
later. This will along with equation(16) give us an intertemporal budget constraint for the worker
which looks like:
Et
26664
1X
i=0
Cwjkt+i
iQ
j=1

t+iRt+j
37775 = RtAwjkt 1 +Hwjkt (27.b)
The problem of the worker is quite complicated and the rst order conditions are messy. In
order to simplify our calculation, We will guess that the consumption function looks like:
Cwjkt = t(RtA
wjk
t 1 +H
wjk
t ) (28)
Where t is the marginal propensity to consume out of life income for the worker. A
wjk
t 1 is
the total non-human asset accumulated up to time t and Hwjkt is the expected lifetime labour
income for the retiree, which is given by:
Hwjkt =Wtl
wjk
t +
!Hwjkt+1

t+1Rt+1
+
(1  !)Hrjkt+1

t+1Rt+1
(29)
where:

t+1 = ! + (1  !)
1
1 
t+1 (30)
where:
t+1 =
t+1
t+1
(31)
and t follows the following law of motion:
t = 1 

Wt
Wt+1
(1 v)
(Rt+1
t+1)
 1 t
t+1
(32)
Now we will guess a functional form for V wjkt :
9
V wjkt = 
w
t C
wjk
t


Wt
1 v
(33)
The rst order condition with respect to Cwjkt along with respective envelope conditions and
equation(30)yields the following euler equation:
!Cwjkt+1 + (1  !) (t+1)

1  Crjkt+1 = (34)"
Wt
Wt+1
(1 v)
Rt+1
n
! + (1  !) (t+1)

1 
o 1
1 
#
Cwjkt
where:
 =

1

1 v
(35)
Finally, the rst order condition for lwjkt looks like
lwjkt = 1 

Wt
Cwjkt (36)
4.3 Derivation of Aggregate Functions
If we look at the consumption functions for a workers, we see two things. First, the MPC at
time period t will be the same for all the workers. Second, The only thing that will di¤er is
their lifetime accumulated income which will vary with each cohort. We can therefore, proceed
to aggregate the consumption for all the workers for a given period t. We will rst drop all the
j and k subscript and derive some more aggregate variables:
Total labor supply by workers
Lwt =
NwP
i=0
lwt (i) =
NwP
i=0

1  
Wt
Cwt (i)

= Nwt  
NwP
i=0

Wt
Cwt (i) = N
w
t  

Wt
Cwt (37)
Total labour supply by the retirees:
Lrt =
NrP
i=0
lrt (i) = N
r
t  
NrP
i=0

Wt
Crt (i) = N
r
t  

Wt
Crt (38)
The aggregate e¤ective labour supply to the economy:
Lt = L
w
t + L
r
t (39)
Aggregate non-human wealth by all worker at time t:
Awt 1 =
NwP
i=0
Awt 1(i) (40)
The aggregate life time labor income of the workers at time t
Hwt =WtL
w
t +
!Hwt+1
(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1
+
(1  !)Hrt+1
(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1 t+1
(41)
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By summing up the individual guess function for Consumption, we can derive the aggregate
consumption function for workers
Cwt = t(RtA
w
t 1 +H
w
t ) (42)
Similarly, we can derive aggregate relationships for the retirees:
Crt = t(RtA
r
t 1 +H
r
t ) (43)
Hrt = WtL
r
t +
Hrt+1 t
Rt+1 t+1
(44)
The aggregate wealth of the economy for the workers and the retirees look like:
Art = A
r
t 1Rt + WtL
r
t   Crt   (1  !)
 
Awt 1Rt +WtL
w
t   Cwt

(45)
Awt = !
 
Awt 1Rt +WtL
w
t   Cwt

(46)
Ct = C
w
t + C
r
t (47)
Let us dene At 1 as the aggregate wealth of the economy at period t and t 1 =
Art 1
At 1 as the
share of the asset held by the retirees. It also follows that 1  t 1 = A
w
t 1
At 1 . Using these two and
also equation (41) and (42)we can rewrite the aggregate wealth of the economy as follows
At

t
!
  1  !
!

= Rtt 1At 1 + WtLrt   Crt (48)
Finally, using the denition of the aggregate wealth, equation (38) and (39) looks like:
Cwt = t [Rt (1  t 1)At 1 +Hwt ] (49)
Crt = t [Rtt 1At 1 +H
r
t ] (50)
4.4 Production side of the economy
Production is subject to a neoclassical production function with labour augmenting technological
progress:
Yt = (XtLt)
K1 t 1 (1)
where the technology follows an AR(1) process:
lnXt+1 = x lnXt + e1t+1; 0 < x < 1 (2)
The wage rate and return on capital are determined as:
Wt = 
Yt
Lt
(53)
Rt = (1  ) Yt
Kt 1
+ (1  ) (54)
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Capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kt = Yt   Ct + (1  )Kt 1 (55)
Finally we close the model by specifying the relationship between the capital stock and the
wealth4:
Kt = At 8 t (56)
4.5 Denition of Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous predetermined variables {Kt 1; Art 1; Awt 1}
and a sequence
of endogenous variables ft; t;
t;Hrt ;Hwt ; Cwt ; Crt ;Wt; Rt; Awt ; Artg, that satisfy equations 37-
56, given the sequence of the exogenous predetermined variables {Nt+1, Xt+1} specied by (6)
and (59), and given the initial values of all the predetermined variables, Kt, At, Nt, and Xt.
5 Model with PAYGO-Dened Benet Social Security System
In the PAYGO model we will consider optimization where there is a PAYGO social security
system for the retiree. The role of the government will be to carry out this transfer to the present
retirees by taxing the present workers. The government will impose a payroll tax on the workers.
The retirees, although working, are not subject to the payroll tax. The benet which will include
a participation rate which will determine how much transfer the retirees receive will be xed in
the dened benet case. The above two are assumptions of the model where the former is made
to simplify the solution of the model and the latter is a specication used in the literature. The
income of the retirees will still be annuitized so that accidental bequest is prevented.
5.1 Optimization by the Retiree
The optimization problem by the retiree looks very similar to the baseline case except for the
fact that the retirees now also receive a social security payment Erjkt = BWt, where B is a xed
dened benet rate, or the participation rate. For a retiree at t who participates in a perfect
annuities market, his optimization problem looks like:
V rjkt (A
r
t 1)
fCrjk;lrjkg
=
nh
Crjkt
v
(1  lrjkt )1 v
i
+ 

V rt+1 (A
r
t )
o 1 (57)
Subject to:
4 In order to see that equation(56) holds, lets add up equation (45) and (46), and we get
Art +A
w
t = Rt (A
r
t 1 +A
w
t 1) +Wt (L
r
t + L
w
t )  Crt   Cwt
Using the fact that, At 1 = Art 1 +A
w
t 1 for t and t  1 and equation (39), and substituting the value of Rt and
Wt from equation (53) and (54), the above equation can be written as:
At = (1  ) YtKt 1At 1 + (1  )Kt 1 + 
Yt
Lt
Lt   Crt   Cwt
Now if Kt 1 = At 1, then the above equation can be written as:
At = Yt + (1  )Kt 1   Crt   Cwt
Where the right hand side of the eqaution is identical to the right hand side of equation (55). Therefore,
Kt = At
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Arjkt =
RtA
rjk
t 1

+Wtl
rjk
t   Crjkt +BWt (58)
With 0    1:
Similar to the private annuity market case, the retirees will have a Ponzi constraint like
equation(14). Their intertemporal budget constraint now looks like:
Et
26664
1X
i=0
iCrjkt+i
iQ
j=1
Rt+j
37775 = RtA
rjk
t 1

+Hrjkt + S
rjk
t (58.a)
Where Srjkt is expected lifetime social security payment to the retiree, to be dened later.
The rst order condition with respect Crt along with respective envelope conditions yields very
similar Euler equation for the retiree:
Crjkt+1 =
"
Wt
Wt+1
(1 v)
(Rt+1)
#
Crjkt (59)
The rst order condition with respect to lrjkt along with respective envelope conditions yields
the following conditions:
lrjkt = 1 

Wt
Crjkt (60)
where  is dened in equation(18)
Similar to the baseline case, I guess that the consumption function looks like:
Crjkt = t(
RtA
rjk
t 1

+Hrjkt + S
rjk
t ) (61)
Where t is the marginal propensity to consume(MPC) out of life income for the retiree. A
r
t 1
is the total non-human asset accumulated up to time t and Hrt is the expected lifetime labour
income for the retiree, dened in equation (21) and Srjkt is the expected lifetime social security
payment which is given by:
Srjkt =
1X
v=0
vErt+v
Nrt+v
vQ
z=0
Rt+z+1
=
Ert
N rt
+
Srjkt+1
Rt+1
(62)
Lets explain the term on the right hand side of the equation (62). Ert+v = N
r
t+vBWt+v is the
total social security payments that all the retirees expect to get paid at some period in the future
t+ v:In order to get the individual transfer, we divide it by the total retiree population in period
t + v:This individual payment is conditional on the fact that the retiree survives up to period
v. That is why v is multiplied with the individual transfer. Finally, we have to discount the
transfer to get the present value all future social security payment. This explains the discounting
term in the denominator.
We will also have similar guess of the following form for the vrt ,
V rjkt = 
r
tC
rjk
t


Wt
1 v
(63)
Where we can again prove that
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rt = (t)
 1
 (64)
Finally, the MPC follows the same law of motion as with the baseline case
t = 1 

Wt
Wt+1
(1 v)
R 1t+1 
t
t+1
(65)
5.2 Optimization by the Worker
The workers problem would also be similar except now he has to pay a payroll tax on his wage
income. We will assume that the worker pays a constant payroll tax  on his wage income. The
workers maximization problem looks like:
V wjkt (A
w
t 1)
fCwjk;lwjkg
=
nh
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i
+ 
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rt+1

Aw
rjk
t
io 1
(66)
Subject to:
Awjkt = RtA
wjk
t 1 + (1   t)Wtlwjkt   Cwjkt (67)
Aw
rjk
t = RtA
wjk
t 1   Cwjkt (68)
where the intuition behind the equation(67) and (68) was explained in the previous section.
The Ponzi constraint of the worker is same as the private annuity case. Now the intertemporal
budget constraint looks like the following:
Et
26664
1X
i=0
Cwjkt+i
iQ
j=1

t+iRt+j
37775 = RtAwjkt 1 +Hwjkt + Swjkt (68.a)
Where Swjkt is expected lifetime social security payment to the worker, to be dened later.
We will again guess that the consumption function looks like:
Cwjkt = t(RtA
wjk
t 1 +H
wjk
t + S
wjk
t ) (69)
Where t is the marginal propensity to consume out of life income for the worker. A
wjk
t 1 is
the total non-human asset accumulated up to time t and Hwjkt is the expected lifetime labour
income for the retiree, which is given by:
Hwjkt =Wtl
wjk
t +
!Hwjkt+1

t+1Rt+1
+
(1  !)Hrjkt+1

t+1Rt+1
(70)
where 
t+1has been dened in the last section. Now S
wjk
t is the present value of expected
lifetime social security that the workers will receive when they retire. Swjkt will be dened as
follows:
Swjkt =
1X
v=0
!v(1 !)Srt+v+1
Nrt+v+1

t+v+1Rt+v+1
t+v+1
t+v+1
vQ
z=0
Rt+z+1
t+z+1
=
(1  !)Srt+1
N rt+1
t+1Rt+1
t+1
t+1
+
!Swjkt+1

t+1Rt+1
(71)
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Lets explain the term on the right hand side of the equation(71). If the worker retires in
period t+ v+1, he will receive a social security payment of Srt+v+1 divided by the population at
t+ v + 1. So,
Srt+v+1
Nrt+v+1
t+v+1Rt+v+1
t+v+1
t+v+1
is the capitalized value of the social security for a worker
who was working at period t+ v and retired at t+ v + 1:In order to receive that social security
payment, the person has to be a worker up to period t + v and then retires with probability
(1 !) at t+v+1. This explains why !v(1 !) is multiplied with the capitalized value. Finally,
in order to get the present value of the social security payment at period t, we have discount
this future payment. This explains the discounting factor that appears in the denominator of
equation(71).
The law of motion for t looks like:
t = 1 

(1   t)Wt
(1   t+1)Wt+1
(1 v)
(Rt+1
t+1)
 1 t
t+1
(72)
We will have similar guess about the functional form for V wjkt :
V wjkt = 
w
t C
wjk
t


(1   t)Wt
1 v
(73)
The rst order condition with respect to Cwjkt along with respective envelope conditions and
equation(30)yields the following Euler equation:
!Cwjkt+1 + (1  !) (t+1)

1  Crjkt+1 = (74)"
(1   t)Wt
(1   t+1)Wt+1
(1 v)
Rt+1
n
! + (1  !) (t+1)

1 
o 1
1 
#
Cwjkt
where is dened in the previous section.
Finally, the rst order condition for lwjkt looks like very similar to the baseline case
lwjkt = 1 

(1   t)WtC
wjk
t (75)
5.3 Derivation of Aggregate Functions
In the case of the PAYGO-DB system, there will be an additional aggregate constraints, the
government budget. Following Bohn(2002), the government uses xed pension benet nanced
by a payroll tax on the current workers. Taxes and Benets are conveniently stated in terms of
a payroll tax rate  t and a xed replacement rate B:Denoting  tWtLwt real value of aggregate
tax revenue from the worker and Ert = N
r
t BWt to be the real value of aggregate social security
payment to the retiree, the Government Budget constraint looks like
N rt BWt =  tWtL
w
t (76)
In order to derive the rest of the aggregate relationships, we aggregate equations 60-75 ac-
cording to their respective populations and get the following
Lwt = N
w
t  

(1   t)WtC
w
t (77)
Lrt = N
r
t  

Wt
Crt (78)
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Cwt = t [Rt (1  t 1)At 1 +Hwt + Swt ] (79)
Crt = t [Rtt 1At 1 +H
r
t + S
r
t ] (80)
Hwt = (1   t)WtLwt +
!Hwt+1
(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1
+
(1  !)Hrt+1
(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1 t+1
(81)
Hrt = WtL
r
t +
Hrt+1 t
Rt+1 t+1
(82)
Srt = N
r
t BWt +
Srt+1 t
(1 + nt+1)Rt+1 t+1
(83)
Swt =
(1  !)Nwt Srt+1
N rt+1
t+1Rt+1
t+1
t+1
+
!Swt+1

t+1Rt+1 (1 + nt+1)
(84)
At

t
!
  1  !
!

= Rtt 1At 1 + WtLrt   Crt +N rt BWt (85)
The equations for t and t, Kt,Rt, Wt, Xt, 	t, N
w
t , nt+1 and Yt are same as the previous
section.
The Production side of the economy did not change. We can therefore proceed to dene the
Competitive equilibrium in the PAYGO system
5.4 Denition of Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in the PAYGO system is a sequence of endogenous predetermined vari-
ables fKt 1; Art 1; Awt 1g and a sequence of endogenous variables

t; t;
t;H
r
t ;H
w
t ; C
w
t ; L
r
t ; L
w
t ;
Crt ;Wt; Rt; A
w
t ; A
r
t

,
that satisfy equations 76-85 given the sequence of the exogenous predetermined variables { Nt+1,
Xt+1} specied by (6) and (59) and a given exogenous rate of payroll tax  , and given the initial
values of all the predetermined variables, Kt, At, Nt, and Xt.
6 Model with PAYGO-Dened Contribution Social Security Sys-
tem
The PAYGO-Dened Contribution will be identical to the Dened benet system except for
the fact that now the contribution will be xed. Following Bohn(2002) again,the government
uses pension benet nanced by a xed payroll tax on the current workers. Taxes and Benets
are conveniently stated in terms of a xed payroll tax rate  and a variable replacement rate
Bt:Denoting WtLwt real value of aggregate tax revenue from the worker and E
r
t = N
r
t BtWt
to be the real value of aggregate social security payment to the retiree, the government budget
constraint looks like
N rt BtWt = WtL
w
t (86)
The optimization will be identical to the dened benet case, including the Ponzi contraints
and the intertemporal budget constraints. Most of the aggregate relationships will remain un-
changed. The ones that will changed are summarized as follows:
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Lwt = N
w
t  

(1   t)WtC
w
t (87)
Hwt = (1  )WtLwt +
!Hwt+1
(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1
+
(1  !)Hrt+1
(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1 t+1
(88)
Srt = N
r
t BtWt +
Srt+1 t
(1 + nt+1)Rt+1 t+1
(89)
At

t
!
  1  !
!

= Rtt 1At 1 + WtLrt   Crt +N rt BtWt (90)
The denition of competitive equilibrium will be identical to the dened benet case where
the above new equations has to be satised in equilibrium.
7 Model with Fully Funded-Dened Benet Social Security
In the Fully Funded(FF from now on) dened benet model we will consider optimization where
there is a FF social security system for the retiree. This system is di¤erent from the PAYGO
system in a number of ways. First, under the FF system, a worker pays payroll tax throughout
his working life. Second, this tax revenue is put into a fund where the government invests the
proceeds(social security fund). Finally, when the person retires, he receives social security which
would be the tax revenue he accumulated plus the interest. For simplicity, we will assume the
worker pays a payroll tax  t . The retirees again will not be taxed. When the worker moves
into the retirement phase, he will receive the accumulated tax revenue plus interest. Making
retirement benet contigent on the life long tax payments throughout working phase is the correct
mechanism. But it is very complicated, we will assume that the retirees benet is linked to the
taxes paid right before retirement. In this way, the fully funded dened benet(DB) system
will be a notional fully funded system where the nancing formula uses a Bismarckian Rule5,
where the pensions are related to the partial earnings history, in our case, the history just before
retirement.
7.1 Optimization by the Retiree
The optimization problem by the retiree looks very similar to the PAYGO Dened Benet case,
including the Ponzi contraints and the intertemporal budget constraints, except for the fact that
the retireessocial security now depends on the tax collected from the workers previously. For a
retiree at t who participates in a perfect annuities market, he chooses Crjk; lrjk to maximize (57)
subject to the (58). The rst order conditions are same as (59) and (60).
Similar to the PAYGO case, I guess that the consumption function looks like:
Crjkt = t(
RtA
rjk
t 1

+Hrjkt + S
rjk
t ) (91)
t,A
r
t 1 ,Hrt has been dened before and S
rjk
t is the expected lifetime social security payment
which, although dened before, is given by:
5For an elaborate discussion on the Bismarckian rule and other nancing rule such as the Beveridgean Rule, see
Docquier and Paddison(2003)
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Srjkt =
1X
v=0
vErt+v
Nrt+v
vQ
z=0
Rt+z+1
=
Ert
N rt
+
Srjkt+1
Rt+1
(92)
Where Ert+v = N
r
t+vBWt+v is the aggregate social security payments that all the retirees in
period t receives. We will also have similar guess for the V rt as (63) and condition (89) has to be
satised. The MPC of the retirees will also follows the same law of motion as the equation (65)
7.2 Optimization by the Worker
The workers problem would also be similar except now he has to pay a payroll tax on his wage
income. We will assume that the worker pays a constant payroll tax  t on his wage income. The
workers will choose Cwjkt ; l
wjk
t to maximize (66) subject to (67) and (68). We will again guess
identical function for the consumption function as the PAYGO-DB. All the variables have the
same functional form. The law of motion for t is identical as the PAYGO-DB case. We will
have similar guess about the functional form for V wjkt .The rst order condition with respect to
Cwjkt and l
wjk
t yields identical solutions as the PAYGO-DB case.
7.3 Derivation of Aggregate Functions
Just like the PAYGO-DB system, in the case of the FF-DB system, there will be an additional
aggregate constraint, the government budget. The government distribute social security payment
among the retirees which will be collected as payroll tax from the workers from the previous
period. Following Abel(2003) and Karni and Zilcha(1989), denoting  tWt 1Lwt 1 aggregate tax
revenue from the worker from period t 1 and N rt BWtto be the aggregate social security payment
to the retiree, the Government Budget constraint looks like
N rt BWt =
 
 tWt 1Lwt 1

Rt (93)
The capital market clearing condition now looks like:
Kt = A
r
t +A
w
t +  tWtL
w
t 8 t (94)
The rest of the aggregate relationships are identical to equations (77)-(85).
7.4 Denition of Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in the FF-DB will be same as the PAYGO-DB where all the previous
conditions have to be satised and also equation 93 and 94 are satised.
8 Model with Fully Funded-Dened Contribution Social Secu-
rity
The FF-DC will be identical to the DB system except for the fact that now the contribution will
be xed. Following Karni and Zilcha(1989) again,the FF-DC budget constraint looks like:
N rt BtWt =
 
Wt 1Lwt 1

Rt (95)
All other aggregate relationships will remain unchanged except some whose form will look
like the new set of equations dened in case of the PAYGO-DC case.
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9 Calibration and nature of experiments under di¤erent pension
systems
There are two sources of growth in this economy, the population growth and the technological
progress. Thus in steady state all the quantity variables grow at the exogenously given rate
of growth of the e¤ective labor force, XtLwt , which is equal to (1 + x)(1 + n)  (1 + x + n).
Because there is growth in the steady state, we have normalize each of the choice variables.
For Yt;Hrt ;H
w
t ; C
w
t ; C
r
t ; L
w
t ; L
r
t ; Lt and Kt 1, we use XtNwt and for Wt we use Xt as the scaling
factor. Appendix 1,2 and 3 shows the derivation, scaling and the steady state system for the
private annuity market without social security. The rest of the models are derived in the similar
manner.
Table 1 shows calibrated values of the exogenous parameters used in this paper. The calibra-
tion of each of the models is very crucial. It is therefore important to specify the calibration strat-
egy very clearly. First, PAYGO-DB will serve as the baseline model for this paper because it is the
system that operates in existence. In order to calibrate the model to derive steady state values of
our choice variables, I will choose values for the exogenous parameters ; ; ; ; ; !; ; ; x; n and
:The value of  and ! are taken from Auerbach and Kotiliko¤(1987). They are chosen so that
a person spends 45 years as worker and 10 years as retired.Following Ferrero(2005), individuals
are assumed to enter the workforce as workers when they are 20 years old and work on average
(1  !) 1 years. The value of the parameter ! = 0:977 is chosen to match a 45-year average
permanence in the labor force, which corresponds to Auerbach and Kotiliko¤(1987), where the
calibration is done as follows:
(1  !) 1 = 45) ! = 44
45
= 0:977 (96)
The value of the survival probability of a retiree,  is chosen to be 0.80 to match the average
expected lifetime horizon for a retiree, which is equal to 70 years for the US and EU. The formula
works as follows:
65 + (1  ) 1 = 70)  = 4
5
= 0:80 (97)
Therefore, we use the above mentioned values for the choice parameters. The value of 
and  is taken from Cooley(1995). The rest of the variables are taken from Campbell(1994) but
can also be found in Rebelo and King(1988). The value of  and  are the most crucial and
controversial parameters of the model. I will calibrate them simultaneously along with two other
important variables of the model, the social security tax and the replacement rate, or the benet
rate. The choice of using appropriate value for the social security tax and the benet rule is very
important. Bohn(2002) uses the value of  to be 12.4% and value of the benet rate to be be
in between 30% and 40%. But unlike him, I have more restriction in my calibration because I
have to also match the real interest rate for the economy which should be very close to 3%. I
will choose a plausible value for  so that I get a plausible value for the participation rate. In
case of the PAYGO-DB, I will choose  and  to be 0.50 and 0.96 and the participation rate to
be 24.9%. The system of nonlinear equations in the steady state then will yield a steady state
tax rate to be equal to 12.4% which matches with Bohn(2002)6.These two values will serve as
the benchmark values. In case of the DB systems, we will keep the participation rate constant at
24.9% and determine the tax rate. In case of the DC systems, we will keep the tax rate constant
6Trying to calibrate the value of participation rate to be equal to 30% and tax rate to be 12.4% and achieve a
real interest rate to be close to 3 % was a di¢ cult task and will consider values of  and  which are usually used
in the literature. I will therefore, only use plausible values of them . This will give a real interest rate which is
close to 3%, a tax rate which is 12.4% and a benet rate which is close to 30%.
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at 12.4% and will determine the participation rate. As we will show, in order to get tax rate and
participation rate under the FF system similar to the the PAYGO, we will assume the value of
 to be 0.958 instead of 0.96. For the Private Annuity market, I will use the baseline parameter
from the PAYGO-DB system. Table-1 reports all the parameter values to be used in the model.
Now the nature of the experiment that I will conduct has to be specied clearly. My ex-
periment will look at the impulse response functions and transitional dynamics of the systems
when there is an unanticipated permanent 1% increase in the growth rate of workforce. I will use
Gensys algorithm to derive my impulse response functions. My methodology to derive impulse
response of a permanent shock will follow Leeper and Yang(2006). Dene
^
Zt = log(
s
Zt
s
Z
) to be the
log deviation of a variable from its balanced growth trajectories. We then log-linearize the entire
system of equations and feed in to the Gensys algorithm developed by Sims(2002). After identi-
fying that the systems have a unique solution,I proceed to derive the impulse response functions
of the choice variables for a one percent permanent shock to the growth rate of the workforce.
The derivation is done in two steps. First, Gensys calculates the initial response of the variables
to the population shock. Next, I iterate on the initial response for 100 periods and derive the
impulse response functions of the variables in the system.
10 Comparison of Performance under di¤erent Social security
Our economic analysis of the economy under alternative pensions systems will be done in six
steps. First, we will look at performance of the economy under initial steady state of the system
when the population is stationary. Second, we will look at the immediate response of the economy
of a permanent population shock. Third, we will look at the dynamics of the economy during
the transition to the new steady state. Fourth, we will compare the economy under initial and
new steady state. Fifth, we will compare the social welfare of the economy before and after the
permanent population shock. Finally, we will simulate our model and compare the volatility of
the fundamental variables of our model under di¤erent social security regime when there is a
population shock.
10.1 Analysis of Initial Steady State
Table 2 reports the steady state values of the variables of each of the systems before and after a
permanent shock. We see several interesting results. First, In the initial steady state, the MPC
for the retiree is signicantly larger than the MPC for the workers under alternative systems.
Lower MPC for the worker is a desirable property of my life-cycle model because it is consistent
with the classic lifecycle model predictions of Modigliani(1956) and Harrod(1948). Therefore, the
model passes the rst acid test because it mimics life-cycle consumption propensity. Second, The
initial steady state capital is also largest for the perfect annuity model. The PAYGO system has
higher capital than the FF system. The initial steady state capital is also higher under PAYGO
for both the worker and the retiree. Third, Overall, the retirees supply little labor compared to
the workers. In the initial steady state,total labor supply is the largest for the perfect annuity
model. Workers labor supply is lowest under FF system. Retirees labor supply is similar under
PAYGO or FF and lower than perfect annuity market. According to Feldstein(2005), a perfect
annuity market with no social security will surely yield higher capital accumulation when there
is stationary population. This is because social security involves some form of taxation(either
xed or exible) which distorts savings by the worker. This is evident by a 17% decline in initial
steady state savings(comparing row 9, column 2 and column 5 of table 2) by the worker under
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PAYGO and a 21% decline in case of FF(comparing row 9, column 2 and column 8 of table
2). Again, social security benets(dened or exible) distorts savings by the retiree which was
highlighted by Bohn(2002). The disincentive of the retiree to save more results in a 56% reduction
in savings under PAYGO and a 62% decline in case of FF. Overall, there is a 11% decline in
total savings under PAYGO and 15% decline under FF. These are much lower compared to a
30-50% reduction estimated by Feldstein(1974). But the puzzling fact is that FF yields lower
savings than PAYGO. A closer analysis should resolve this issue. First, notice that the nature of
income inequality is identical under PAYGO and FF in the initial steady state. Second, retirees
labor supply under these two regimes are almost identical. Hence, total labor supply decline
because of the decline in workers labor supply. With a slightly higher wage in the PAYGO
systems, the retirees enjoy higher labor income than FF. Although rental rate is slightly lower
under the PAYGO, the workers with much bigger chunk of capital earns a higher capital income
than the retirees. Finally, since the social security benet is same under PAYGO and FF in the
initial steady state(as was the objective of my calibration exercise), the retirees, overall, has lower
income under FF than under PAYGO. Therefore, PAYGO with higher income for both workers
and retirees results in a higher capital accumulation in PAYGO than FF. From the risk sharing
perspective of the social security systems, we notice one striking result. In an economy where the
retirees work part time , an Intergenerational risk sharing mechanism like the FF systems fail
to outperform an Intergenerational risk sharing mechanism like the PAYGO. The above analysis
suggests that the distortion created by social security has been dominated by a combination of
favorable rental rate and an unfavorable wage rate movement. Bohn(1998) argues that this is
only possible when 1  is below the capital and labor share of the output. In our PAYGO and
FF models, the former is 0.1415 where the later two are 0.333 and 0.667 respectively. Again
since the capital-share of output dominates labor share, interest rate movement dominates the
wage rate movement e¤ect. Finally,The initial steady state output is the largest for the perfect
annuity model. The PAYGO systems have higher output than the FF systems. The rst part
of the observation is consistent with other works on life-cycle models like Feldstein(1974) and
Feldstein(2005) which argue that a fully e¢ cient perfect annuity market creates no additional
distortion in the economy and therefore, should yield higher output. The better performance
of the PAYGO models follow from the superior performance of the former in terms of capital
accumulation and inducing slightly higher labor supply than the FF model.
10.2 Analysis of Immediate Impact of a Permanent Population Shock
Table 3 reports the immediate response of each of the systems after a permanent population
shock. The responses are presented in log deviating terms from the initial balanced growth
trajectories, which in terms of our scaled variable models, a log-deviation from the initial steady
state. We notice some interesting aspects of the immediate responses. First, Consumption of
both worker and retiree responds positively to the population growth shock. The response is
largest under the private annuity model. DC systems o¤er better response to consumption.
Second, PAYGO-DB seems to share consumption risk across the workers and the retirees better
than any other social security arrangements. The private annuity market has the worst risk
sharing performance. Third, capital shows consistent decline across all models. The rate of
decline is the smallest under PAYGO-DB. Workers savings shows slower decline than the retirees.
Retirees savings decline faster under the DC systems, specially under the FF. Fourth,Output
response is smallest under the PAYGO-DC. Fifth, total labor supply declines immediately across
all regimes. Workers increase their labor supply under the DB systems and decrease under DC.
The retirees dramatically decreases their labor supply consistently across di¤erent regimes. Sixth,
upon impact, decline in output is smallest under FF-DB. Seventh,upon impact, decline in capital
is the smallest under the DB systems. Eighth, upon impact, the absolute di¤erence between the
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response of the workers and the retirees are the smallest under FF-DB, then under PAYGO-DB.
The di¤erence is largest under the Private Insurance model. Finally, impact on wage is positive
across all regimes. Impact on real interest rate is positive only under the DB systems.
Although analyzing risk sharing behavior is not the main purpose of this paper, this is indeed
a very interesting results which needs some explanations. Bohn(2002) argues that population
risk are not naturally shared by di¤erent cohorts. Population growth raises the marginal product
of capital and while it reduces the marginal product of labor. Government policy can allocate
this risk by appropriate transfers and taxes. We see this result in our model too. Measuring risk
sharing by looking at the absolute di¤erence between the immediate response of consumption for
the workers and the retirees7(row 4, table 6), we see that the private annuity market clearly fails
to share risk associated with the population shock in Bohns sense. Similar to Bohn, PAYGO-DB
outperforms all other social security arrangement.
An analysis of the causes behind the above mentioned results are crucial for understanding
the entire dynamical response of our model to population shock under di¤erent regimes. We
will adopt a blend of RBC and public nance approach to explain the immediate response of
our models. Combining Rebelo and King(2002) and Bohn(1998), we will decompose the e¤ect of
population shock into wage e¤ect and interest e¤ect and the social security e¤ect. In case of the
PAYGO-DB, we will start with the social security e¤ect. An increase in the number of worker
reduces the dependency ratio, which with a DB system, reduces payroll tax(table 3, row 21 and
22). This results in a decline of the total benet to the retirees, although the benet rule is
xed(table 3, row 21 and 23). The social security e¤ect is therefore a negative income e¤ect to
the retiree and a positive income e¤ect on the worker. With almost no to very small decline in
the real interest rate,retirees savings go down. The wage e¤ect of the population is very strange.
There is a an immediate reduction of labor supply by the worker and the retiree. We therefore
see a slight increase in the wage rate. The running down of savings and the decline labor supply
also justies the immediate increase in consumption for both the worker and the retiree. The
PAYGO-DB shares similar dynamics with the FF-DB. With PAYGO-DC, however, there is a
small visible decline in the real interest rate with larger increase in wage. The decline is labor
supply is now larger a which coupled with a larger decline now reduces output at a higher rate.
The FF-DC exhibits similar behavior as the PAYGO-DC.
10.3 Analysis of the Transition Path after a Permanent Population Shock
Figure 6-9 shows the impulse response of the major aggregate variables in my model after a
permanent shock. Since the impulse response functions show log deviations of the variables from
their balanced growth trajectories, they are not convenient to analyze the changes in the level of
the variables during the transition. I therefore report transitional dynamics of the variables in
levels(each variables are scaled) in gures 10-15. The transitional dynamics will also analyzed by
using wage rate, interest rate e¤ect and the social security e¤ect.
In case of the PAYGO-DB, wage goes down, real interest rate goes up and social security
tax goes down in the transition. For the worker, he faces a combination of negative wage rate-
related income e¤ect, positive interest rate-related income e¤ect and a positive payroll tax-related
income e¤ect. The negative e¤ects dominate at the beginning and we see an increase in labor
supply. After that and we see a steady decline of consumption, savings and labor supply. For
7Bohn(2002) argues that for standard time-separable homothetic preferences, ex-ante e¢ ciency has strong
implication: the consumption of workers and retirees should be equally exposed to population shocks. He uses
The Method of Undeterminant Coe¢ cients follwing King and Rebelo(1998) to calculate the elasticity coe¢ cient of
consumption for population shock. This is similar to looking at the di¤erence between the immediate impact reponse
of consumption in our model. The smaller the absolute di¤erence between the impact response of consumption by
the retiree and the worker, the better is the risk sharing.
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the retiree, his social security e¤ect is negative, because total benet falls. For him, negative
e¤ects now dominate and we see gradual increase in labor supply, decline in consumption and
savings. The overall e¤ect on capital accumulation is quite negative and the e¤ect on total labor
supply is slightly positive during the transition path. We therefore see a slow decline in the
output. Therefore, PAYG0-DB social security distorts output, savings, consumption smoothing
and forces retirees to work more.
In case of the PAYGO-DC, the retirees now receive larger total benet because the benet
rate goes up. But the negative wage e¤ect clearly dominates and we see similar increase labor
supply as with the PAYGO-DB. But favorable movement of the benet and interest rate allows
them to decrease saving slowly. On the other hand, a decline in wage coupled with a xed tax
rate implies a larger tax burden on the worker. His after tax wage is smaller. This results in a
rapid de-accumulation of savings along with a slight decline in the labor supply. The ultimate
outcome is again a decline in capital and output.
In case of the FF-DB, a decline in the tax rate results in a decline in the total benet for the
retiree. This and the decline in wage triggers a melt down of savings for the retiree along with an
increase in the labor supply. The negative wage e¤ect for the worker cannot be compensated by
the reduction in tax rate. Hence we see a similar decline in savings and a small decline in labour
supply. The nal outcome is a decline in output and savings.
In case of the FF-DC, the e¤ect on the worker mimics PAYG0-DC. But for retiree, the increase
in total benet enables them to de-accumulate savings slower than FF-DB. But this time, worker
dominates and wee see a slightly decline in output and capital.
The private annuity model is also quite interesting. Without social security, retiree now works
more, saves much less. The worker on the other hand, does not face any tax distortion. This
allows him to de-accumulate his savings slowly, consume more compared to rest of the regimes
and increase the supply of labor. All this results in output and capital levels along transition
path which are visibly higher than any other social security regime.
In summary, the transition dynamics is determined by the combination of wage, interest rate
and social security e¤ect. In these experiments, wage e¤ect will dominate the interest rate e¤ect.
With PAYGO-DB, the negative wage e¤ect slightly overcomes positive real interest rate and tax
e¤ect for the worker. For the retiree, negative wage and total benet e¤ect clearly outweighs
the positive real interest rate e¤ect. In case of PAYGO-DC, the increase in the total benet has
a positive e¤ect on retirees income which creates larger distortion in savings and labour supply
decision. As a result, we end up with slightly lower output in the new steady state than the
PAYGO-DB. The FF-DB adds to the woes of the retirees by decreasing their benet. The result
is a lower accumulation of capital and hence, output compared to the PAYGO-DB case. Finally,
FF-DC performs the worst because the negative wage e¤ect is the largest and the increase in the
real interest rate causes largest decline in their lifetime labour income and lifetime social security.
The result is the lowest accumulation of capital and hence, lowest output. None of the social
security distortion is present in the private annuity market. Hence it performs the best in terms
of capital accumulation and output.
10.4 Comparison Between Initial and New Steady State
Table 2 shows a comparison between initial steady state and the new one. The dynamic responses
of the system is not fundamentally di¤erent across regime. A worker population growth rate
worsens economic conditions in all the regimes, consumption, output and savings all go down.
Private annuity market performs better than any other social security regime in absorbing the
shock. The surprising result is that PAYGO-DB outperforms all other social security regime just
like it did in the initial steady state. Critical analysis of the transition path has pointed out the
reason behind its success.
23
10.5 Welfare Comparison Under Various Pension Regimes
Table 4 reports steady state welfare comparison under di¤erent pension system. Appendix 4 ex-
plains how the social welfare is calculated for each of the pension systems. I report three di¤erent
measure of steady state welfare. V r represents the welfare of the retiree and V w represents the
welfare of the worker. Finally, V represents the aggregate social welfare which is a population
weighted average of V r and V w. Comparing welfare between workers and the retirees across
di¤erent pension systems reveal interesting di¤erences. First, retirees welfare is the same under
PAYGO and FF in the initial steady state. They enjoy higher welfare under FF in the nal
steady state. Second, workers receive higher welfare under FF during the initial and also the
nal steady state. Third,social welfare is maximized under FF both in the initial as well as in the
nal steady state. Fourth, there appears to be a clear trade-o¤ between growth and welfare. The
above results in terms of welfare are consistent with Karni and Zilcha(1989), Feldstein(2005) and
abel(2003).So there is no need to provide any intuition about this result. What is interesting is
that FF systems raise welfare but reduce savings compared to the PAYGO system. This indicates
that when there is a work force growth and when the retirees work part time, a PAYGO system
would be preferable on the savings and growth grounds. But on the welfare grounds, FF is still
the winner
10.6 Volatility of the Economy under various Social Security Regimes
The volatility of the system depends on the speed of convergence of the system. Since population
shock is a negative shock to the system, the existence of some risk sharing mechanism will allow
the economy to converge slower and should also reduce the volatility of the system. Table 5
reports the speed of convergence of the economy under di¤erent social security regime. Without
going into the analysis of individual variables, we see that PAYGO, o¤ering a better risk sharing
mechanism, also helps the economy converge slower than any other arrangement. Private annuity
market help the economy converge faster than any other system in general. This is reected in the
volatility of the system. Table 6 reports the volatility of consumption, output and capital under
various social security arrangements8. It appears that the economy the economy much more
volatile under the private annuity market. FF-DB provides us with the least volatile economy.
Bohn(1998) argues that a system that has the least risk sharing structure would be subject to
most volatility. This is evident in our experiments as well. It is therefore not surprising to nd
that the volatility under PAYGO and FF are comparable because they have some risk sharing
mechanism.
11 Conclusion
In this paper, a serious attempt has been undertaken to model lifecycle demographic uncertainty
into a DSGE framework. An attempt has been made to use tools and experimental setup that
are traditionally been used in the RBC literature. With more rigorous and realistic design of the
social security, this setup can be used very e¤ectively without resorting to non-tractable large
8 In order to simulate the economy under alternative social security systems, I rst draw 10000 observation
on the error term for the populattion growth eqution from a normal distribution with zero mean and very small
variance of 0.00007259. I do this once. I then take the log-linearized system of equations, convert them into levels
and simulate each of the models.
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scale OLG models. The model however has generated some interesting analytical results, some
of which clearly contradicts existing steady state based results, even some large scale modeling
attempt with stationary population. The paper, however, has several limitations which has to
be stated precisely. First, allowing retirees to work but not subjecting them to payroll tax is
very unrealistic. One could get di¤erent results if the latter is allowed. Second, the calibration
exercise plays an important role in deriving the results of the model. The calibration exercise is
not entirely satisfactory because most of the target variables were not calibrated to match data
exactly. But the most serious criticism of the paper is the nature of the experiments that has
been undertaken. In case of DB, it is assumed that only the benet rate is constant while in
the DC case, only the tax rate is assume to be constant. Neither of the assumptions are correct
and they do not resemblance the reality. Although the existing literature follows my strategy,
the correct experiment would to keep the total benet constant in the DB case and keep total
tax revenue constant under the DC case. We can then have a common ground on which we can
evaluate the e¢ cacy of each of the social security arrangements. Without such a design, what
we have done is to work with notional DB and DC system and therefore, the policy implications
of the above experiments have been undermined. In order to verify quantitative precision of the
model predictions, one has to be more careful with the calibration strategy. If it is done, and
if the conclusion of this exercise survives the test, then we have made signicant contribution
to the debate over demographic uncertainty and its e¤ect on social security design and on the
economy in general
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Appendix 1: Solving the Private Annuity model without government
Retirees Problem
The retirees solve the following problem:
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Substituting equation(d) into the rst order condition yields after some simplication, the
following Euler equation for Crjkt :
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First order condition with respect to lrjkt yields:
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Now at the optimum, the envelope condition also suggests:
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Therefore, equating (d) and (f) and after some simplication:
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Finally, substituting the rst order condition for lrjkt into Euler equation for C
rjk
t (equation e)
yields the following compact form of the Euler equation:
Crjkt+1 =
"
Wt+1
Wt
(1 v)
(Rt+1)
#
Crjkt (j)
Now guess that:
Crjkt = t(
RtA
rjk
t 1

+Hrjkt ) (k)
where Hrjkt is dened by equation(19) in the main text. Also guess that the value function
V rjkt has the following form:
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Plugging the guess for V rjkt into the bellman equation for the retiree, we get:
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After substituting the rst order condition for lrjkt and the Euler equation for C
rjk
t on the
right hand side of the equation, we derive law of motion for rt :
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Now substitute the value of Wtl
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t from (19) into the budget constraint of the retiree:
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Substituting the guess of Crjkt into the above equation:
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Now substitute the guess for Crjkt into the Euler equation for C
rjk
t and we get:
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Substituting equation(p) into the above equation:
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After further simplication,:
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Comparing equation (s) with (n) and matching coe¢ cients, we get:
rt = (t)
 1
 (t)
Workers Problem
The worker solve the following problem:
V wjkt (A
w
t 1)
fCwjk;lwjkg
=
nh
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i
+ 
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rt+1

Aw
rjk
t
io 1
(u)
Subject to:
Awjkt = RtA
wjk
t 1 +Wtl
wjk
t   Cwjkt (v)
Aw
rjk
t = RtA
wjk
t 1   Cwjkt (w)
First order condition with respect Cwjk :
1

8<:
h
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i
+
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rt+1

Aw
rjk
t
i
9=;
1

 1
(x)

8>>>>><>>>>>:
2666664
h
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i 1
v 

Cwjkt
v 1
(1  lwjkt )1 v
+
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rwt+1

Aw
rjk
t
i 1"
!
@V wt+1

Awjkt

@Awjkt
@Awjkt
@Cwjkt
+ (1  !)@V
rw
t+1

Aw
rjk
t

@Aw
rjk
t
@Aw
rjk
t
@Cwjkt
#
3777775
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
= 0
Envelope conditions:
@V wt
@Awt 1
j
Cwjkt =C

t (A
w
t 1)
=
@U(Cwjkt ; l
wjk
t )
@Awt 1
j
Cwjkt =C

t (A
w
t 1)
(y)
= (V wt )
1 
h
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i 1
v 

Cwjkt
v 1
(1  lwjkt )1 vRt
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Also because of the risk neutrality assumption, there is another envelope condition which
suggests:
@V wt
@Awt 1
j
Cwjkt =C

t (A
w
t 1)
=
@V rt
@Art 1
j
Crjkt =C

t (A
r
t 1)
(z)
Therefore substituting equation(j) and (d) into the rst order condition and making some
simplication yields the following Euler equation for Cwjkt :

Cwjkt
v 1
(1  lwjkt )(1 v) = (aa)
Rt+1
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rwt+1

Aw
rjk
t
i 1
24 !(V wt+1)1  Cwjkt+1 v 1 (1  lwjkt+1 )(1 v)
+(1  !)(V rt+1)1 

Crjkt+1
v 1
(1  lrjkt+1)(1 v)
35
The rst order condition with respect to lwjkt yields:
1

8<:
h
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i
+
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rt+1

Aw
rjk
t
i
9=;
1

 1
(ab)

8>>>>><>>>>>:
2666664
h
Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt )1 v
i 1
(1  v)

Cwjkt
v
(1  lwjkt ) v
+
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rwt+1

Aw
rjk
t
i 1"
!
@V wt+1

Awjkt

@Awjkt
@Awjkt
@lwjkt
+ (1  !)@V
rw
t+1

Aw
rjk
t

@Aw
rjk
t
@Aw
rjk
t
@lwjkt
#
3777775
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
= 0
Applying same kind of envelope theorem argument as we did for the retirees problem, we
can get:
lwjkt = 1 

Wt
Cwjkt (ac)
Now guess:
Cwjkt = t(RtA
wjk
t 1 +H
wjk
t ) (ad)
Cw
rjk
t = t(RtA
wjk
t 1 ) (ada)
Also guess that vwt has similar form as v
r
t :
V wjkt = 
w
t C
wjk
t


Wt
1 v
(ae)
Finally, also guess that wt has similar form as 
r
t
wt = (t)
 1
 (af)
Substituting rst order condition for lwjkt into the Euler equation for C
wjk
t (equation aa):
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
Cwjkt
v 1
(

Wt
Cwjkt )
(1 v) = (ag)
Rt+1
h
!V wt+1

Awjkt

+ (1  !)V rwt+1

Aw
rjk
t
i 1
24 !(V wt+1)1  Cwjkt+1 v 1 ( WtCwjkt+1 )(1 v)
+(1  !)(V rt+1)1 

Cw
rjk
t+1
v 1
( WtC
wrjk
t+1 )
(1 v)
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Substituting the guess for vwt and v
r
t into the above equation and simplifying:

Cwjkt
 1
= (ah)
Rt+1

Wt
Wt+1
(1 v) h
!wt+1C
wjk
t+1 + (1  !)rt+1Cw
rjk
t+1 
i 1

!(wt+1)
1  + (1  !)(rt+1)1 

Where  is dened in (32). Substituting the value of wt and 
r
t from our guess into the
above equation and simplifying:
h
!Cwjkt+1 + (1  !)(t+1)

1 Cw
rjk
t+1
i
=(
Rt+1

Wt
Wt+1
(1 v) h
! + (1  !)(t+1)
1
1 
i)
Cwjkt (ai)
Now substitute the guess for Cwjkt+1 and the value of Wtl
wjk
t from (27) into the workers rst
budget constraint:
Awjkt +
Hwjkt+1

t+1Rt+1
!
= (1  t)(RtAwjkt 1 +Hwjkt ) (aj)
where 
t+1 is dened in (27).
Also substitute the guess of Cwjkt+1 and C
wrjk
t+1 into the Euler equation of (ai) and simplifying
we get:
t = 1 

Wt
Wt+1
(1 v)
(Rt+1
t+1)
 1 t
t+1
(ai)
This is the law of motion for the MPC of the worker.
Thus we have solved the entire system
Appendix 2: Derivation of the Private Annuity Model with scaled variable
Dening
s
Zt =
Zt
XtNwt
, our system in terms of the scaled variables look like
s
Yt =

s
Lt
 s
Kt 1
1  XtNwt
Xt 1Nwt 1
 1
(A)
s
Cwt = t
24Rt (1  t 1) sKt 1
XtNwt
Xt 1Nwt 1
+
s
Hwt
35 (B)
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s
Crt = t
24Rtt 1 sKt 1
XtNwt
Xt 1Nwt 1
+
s
Hrt
35 (C)
s
Lwt = 1 

s
Wt
s
Cwt (D)
s
Lt = (1 +  t) 

s
Wt
 s
Cwt +
s
Crt

(E)
s
Hwt =
s
Wt
s
Lwt +
!
s
Hwt+1

Xt+1Nwt+1
XtNwt

(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1
(F)
+
(1  !)
s
Hrt+1

Xt+1Nwt+1
XtNwt

(1 + nt+1) 
t+1Rt+1 t+1
s
Hrt = 
s
Wt

s
Lt  
s
Lwt

+

s
Hrt+1 t

Xt+1Nwt+1
XtNwt

Rt+1 t+1
(G)
s
Wt = 
s
Yt
s
Lt
(H)
Rt+1 = (1  )

Xt+1N
w
t+1
XtNwt
 s
Lt+1
 s
Kt
 
+ (1  ) (I)
s
Kt =
s
Yt  
s
Cwt  
s
Crt +
(1  )
s
Kt 1
XtNwt
Xt 1Nwt 1
 (J)
s
Kt

t
!
  1  !
!

=
Rtt 1
s
Kt 1
XtNwt
Xt 1Nwt 1
 +Wt sLt   sLwt   sCrt (K)
t = 1 
0@ sWts
Wt+1
1A(1 v) Xt+1
Xt
(v 1)
(Rt+1
t+1)
 1 t
t+1
(L)
t = 1 
0@ sWts
Wt+1
1A(1 v) Xt+1
Xt
(v 1)
R 1t+1 t+1
t
t+1
(M)
The rest of the equations of the system are repeated below
lnnt+1 = n lnnt + e1t+1, 0 < n < 1 (N)
lnXt+1 = x lnXt + e1t+1; 0 < x < 1 (O)
 t+1(1 + nt+1) =  t + (1  !) (P)
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Nwt+1 = (1 + nt+1)N
w
t (Q)

t+1 = ! + (1  !)
1
1 
t+1 (R)
Equations (a-r)contain the entire dynamics of the system and therefore will be used to solve
model.
Appendix 3: Steady state system of equations of the Private Annuity Model
The steady state system of equations in terms of the scaled variables of the baseline model of
appendix 2 can be written as follows
s
L = (1 +  )  s
W
 s
Cw +
s
Cr

(A)
s
Lw = 1  s
W
s
Cw (B)
s
Cw = 
24R (1  ) sK
(1 + x+ n)
+
s
Hw
35 (C)
s
Cr = 
24 RsK
(1 + x+ n)
+
s
Hr
35 (D)
 = 1  (1 + x)(v 1) (R
) 1 (E)
 = 1  (1 + x)(v 1) R 1 (F)
s
K

1  (1  )
(1 + x+ n)

=
s
Y  
s
Cw  
s
Cr (G)
s
K


!
  1  !
!
  R
(1 + x+ n)

=
s
W

s
L 
s
Lw

 
s
Cr (H)
Hw

1  ! (1 + x)

R

=
s
W
s
Lw +
(1  !)
s
Hr (1 + x)
(1 + n) 
R 
(I)
s
Hr

1   (1 + x)
R 

= 
s
W

s
L 
s
Lw

(J)

 = ! + (1  !) 11  (K)
R = (1  ) (1 + x+ n)

s
L
s
K
 
+ (1  ) (L)
s
W = 
s
Y
s
L
(M)
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s
Y =

s
L
s
K
1 
(1 + x+ n) 1 (N)
 =
(1  !)
(1 + n  ) (O)
All the other models are solved and scaled and their steady state systems are derived in the
similar manner.
Appendix 4: Welfare Calculations under alternative social security Arrangements
From the guess of the value function from the Private annuity market, we calculated that
V rt = 
r
tC
r
t


Wt
1 v
(a)
Where we can again prove that
rt = (t)
 1
 (b)
Also
V wt = 
w
t C
w
t


Wt
1 v
(c)
Where
wt = (t)
 1
 (d)
The guess for the value functions for the PAYGO and the FF systems are similar where the
guess about the retiree is same as the private annuity case while the guess for the workers in case
of the DC systems look like
V wt = 
w
t C
w
t


(1  )Wt
1 v
(e)
Where wt still satises equation(d). In steady state equation (a), (c), (e) in terms of the
scaled variables look like
V r = ()
 1

s
Cr
 


s
W
!1 v
(f)
V w = ()
 1

s
Cw
 

(1  )
s
W
!1 v
(g)
Now in case of the DB systems, the calculations are as follows:
V wt = 
w
t C
w
t


(1   t)Wt
1 v
(h)
Where wt still satises equation(d). In steady state equation (a), (c), (e) in terms of the
scaled variables look like
V r = ()
 1

s
Cr
 


s
W
!1 v
(i)
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V w = ()
 1

s
Cw
 

(1   t)
s
W
!1 v
(j)
We can therefore take the steady state value of
s
Cr;
s
Cw; ; ;
s
W from table-2 along with other
exogenous parameter from table-1 from appendix-15 and can calculate the indirect utility for the
worker and the retiree under alternative systems which again is their welfare. For calculating the
aggregate social welfare, we dene V , the aggregate social welfare as follows
Vt =
Nwt
Nt
V wt +
N rt
Nt
V rt (k)
Which using equation (6.b) can be written as
Vt =
Nwt
Nwt +N
r
t
V wt +
N rt
Nwt +N
r
t
V rt
=
1
1 +
Nrt
Nwt
V wt + Nwt
Nrt
+ 1
V rt (3)
=
1
1 + 1	t
V wt +
1
	t + 1
V rt (l)
Where the last inequality uses the denition of  t. In steady state equation(i) looks like
V =
1
1 + 1	
V w +
1
	+ 1
V r (m)
From equation(3), in steady state, the value of 	 is dened as
 =
(1  !)
1 + n   (n)
We can now calculate the value of 	 from table1. This will allow us to calculate the aggregate
social welfare V once we have calculated the value of V r and V w. Finally, it should be noted
this since Vt is a function of consumption and real wage, which is also measured is terms of
consumption units, welfare is also expressed in terms of consumption units.
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Figure 1: Trends in Immigration: USA and other countries.
Figure 2: Trends in Civillian employment and labor force.
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Trends in Naturalization of Alliens in USA
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Figure 3: Trends in Naturalization of Aliens in USA. Source: United Nations
Figure 4: Trend in Part Time Jobs for the retirees(Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn(2005))
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Figure 5: Trend in Transition to Part Time Jobs for the retirees(Cahill, Giandrea and
Quinn(2005))
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PAYGO FF Private Annuity
Parameter Denition Value Value Value
 Skill Coe¢ cient for the Retiree 0:6 0:6 0:6
 Discount Factor 0:96 0:958 0:96
 Capital Depreciation rate 0:1 0:1 0:1
 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0:25 0:25 0:25
 Labors share in production 0:667 0:667 0:667
! Retirement probability 0:997 0:997 0:997
x Steady state growth rate of technology 0:01 0:01 0:01
n Steady state growth rate of population 0:01 0:01 0:01
v Consumption share in the utility 0:5 0:5 0:5
 1 vv 1:5 1:5 1:5
 Average social security tax 0:124 0:124 0:124
B Participation rate 0:2495 0:2495 0:2495
Table 1: Exogenous Parameters of the Models
Impulse Response of Worker's Consumption to a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 6: Impulse Response of workers consumption to a permanent population shock(Log
Deviations from the steady state)
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Scaled PrivateAnnuity PAYGO-DB FF-DB PAYGO-DC FF-DC
Variables Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Y 0:791 0:753 0:714 0:692 0:704 0:682 0:714 0:681 0:704 0:672
Cw 0:434 0:417 0:369 0:363 0:367 0:361 0:369 0:358 0:367 0:357
Cr 0:075 0:067 0:116 0:103 0:114 0:102 0:116 0:103 0:114 0:102
L 0:460 0:456 0:437 0:437 0:434 0:435 0:437 0:433 0:434 0:431
Lw 0:432 0:432 0:421 0:419 0:418 0:417 0:421 0:415 0:418 0:413
Hw 6:502 5:955 3:726 3:564 3:638 3:478 3:726 3:439 3:638 3:357
Hr 0:306 0:324 0:156 0:263 0:155 0:258 0:156 0:255 0:155 0:251
K 2:391 2:122 1:953 1:790 1:889 1:733 1:953 1:742 1:889 1:687
Kw 1:994 1:811 1:7 1:213 1:643 1:167 1:70 1:101 1:643 1:054
Kr 0:397 0:291 0:254 0:160 0:245 0:154 0:254 0:140 0:245 0:134
 0:166 0:137 0:130 0:089 0:130 0:089 0:130 0:080 0:130 0:080
W 1:148 1:102 1:091 1:056 1:081 1:047 1:091 1:050 1:081 1:041
R 1:012 1:021 1:024 1:032 1:027 1:035 1:024 1:034 1:027 1:036
 0:051 0:054 0:068 0:070 0:069 0:072 0:068 0:071 0:069 0:072
" 0:107 0:111 0:126 0:130 0:128 0:132 0:126 0:130 0:128 0:132
 0:209 0:191 0:209 0:191 0:209 0:191 0:209 0:191 0:209 0:191
Lr 0:016 0:037 0:010 0:024 0:010 0:024 0:010 0:023 0:010 0:024
TaxRate 0:124 0:114 0:124 0:114 0:124 0:124 0:124 0:124
SS Benet 0:0569 0:0503 0:0569 0:0499 0:0569 0:05 0:0564 0:0496
Table 2: Comparison between Initial and Final steady state after a permanent Population shock
Variable PrivateAnnuity PAYGO-DB FF-DB PAYGO-DC FF-DC
Y  0:015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.017 -0.017
Cw 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
Cr 0.063 0.039 0.039 0.049 0.048
AbsDi¤ 0.060 0.036 0.035 0.044 0.043
L -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.021 -0.02
Lw -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
Hw -0.039 -0.0019 -0.019 -0.034 -0.034
Hr 0.1040 0.336 0.329 0.265 0.257
K -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019
Kw -0.015 -0.04 -0.044 -0.047 -0.045
Kr -0.044 -0.064 -0.067 -0.074 -0.071
 -0.028 -0.047 -0.05 -0.055 -0.052
W 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004
R -0.001 0.0 0.0 -0.001 -0.001
 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.038
" 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.026
 -0.10 -0.010 -0.010 -0.01 -0.010
Lr -0.266 -0.010 -0.010 -0.01 -0.010
Sw -0.071 -0.071 -0.034 -0.035
Sr -6.349 -6.169 -2.925 -2.839
Tax Rate -0.010 -0.018
Benet Rate 0.008 -0.004
Total Benet(TB) -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
Table 3: Immediate response of a permanent population shock under alternative social security
arrangements(Log-deviations from the steady state).
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Social Security Systems Initial Steady State Final Steady State
V w V r V V w V r V
Private Annuity 0.026 0.013 0.024 0.027 0.012 0.025
PAYGO-DC 0.033 0.024 0.031 0.034 0.022 0.032
FF-DC 0.034 0.024 0.032 0.035 0.023 0.033
PAYGO-DB 0.033 0.024 0.031 0.034 0.022 0.032
FF-DB 0.034 0.024 0.032 0.035 0.023 0.033
Table 4: Welfare calculations before and after a permanent population shock( = 0:124)
Scaled PrivateAnnuity PAYGO-DC FF-DB PAYGO-DB FF-DC
Variables (Periods) (Periods) (Periods) (Periods) (Periods)
Y 87 44 63 64 45
Cw 55 75 80 71 80
Cr 89 71 59 60 74
L 65 53 64 56 55
Lw 52 74 60 60 71
Hw 51 61 63 71 47
Hr 86 87 67 73 70
K 53 60 59 74 50
 72 91 84 92 95
W 49 61 55 48 76
R 33 52 41 34 24
 44 58 72 59 58
" 38 37 45 43 43
 73 73 73 73 73
Lr 85 70 83 75 81
Table 5: Speed of convergence after a permanent population shock under alternative social
security systems
Scaled PrivateAnnuity PAYGO-DB FF-DB PAYGO-DC FF-DC
Variables (Periods) (Periods) (Periods) (Periods) (Periods)
STD(Y ) 5.99 2.88 2.67 2.95 2.73
STD(Cw) 4.91 2.36 2.21 2.44 2.28
STD(Cr) 4.16 2.02 1.91 2.09 1.98
STD(K) 2.51 1.33 1.29 1.37 1.32
STD(W ) 2.24 1.24 1.20 1.26 1.23
STD(R) 2.15 1.21 1.17 1.23 1.20
STD(C
w
Cr ) 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.16
STD(C
w
Y ) 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84
STD(C
r
Y ) 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72
STD(KY ) 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.78
Table 6: Comparison of Volatility under alternative social security systems(Standard deviation
of the scaled variables)
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Impulse Response of Retiree's Consumption to a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 7: Impulse Response of retirees consumption to a permanent population shock(Log
Deviations from the steady state)
Impulse Response of Capital to a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 8: Impulse Response of capital to a permanent population shock(Log Deviations from
the steady state)
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Impulse Response of Output to a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 9: Impulse Response of output to a permanent population shock(Log Deviations from
the steady state)
Transition Dynamics of Worker's Consumption after a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 10: Transitional dynamics of workers consumption to a permanent population shock(in
levels)
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Transition Dynamics of Retiree's Consumption after a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 11: Transitional dynamics of retirees consumption to a permanent population shock(in
levels)
Transition Dynamics of Capital after a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 12: Transitional dynamics of capital to a permanent population shock(in levels)
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Transition Dynamics of Ouput after a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 13: Transitional dynamics of output to a permanent population shock(in levels)
Transition Dynamics of Wage after a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 14: Transitional dynamics of wage to a permanent population shock(in levels)
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Transition Dynamics of Real Interest Rate after a Permanent Population Shock
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Figure 15: Transitional dynamics of real interest rate to a permanent population shock(in
levels)
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